Where a missile interceptor quickly costs hundreds of thousands of dollars against an attack drone worth a few hundred (see Chapter 2.3), cheaper interceptor drones — with or without net capture — offer a way to restore that arithmetic.
The figures make the shift concrete (Lowy/Ryan, 2026): a Patriot interceptor costs over $3 million and a NASAMS round over $1 million, while a Ukrainian interceptor drone costs $1,000–5,000 — with an interception rate above 90% (March 2026). Ukraine has now built 100,000 interceptor drones and supplies about 1,500 a day, radar-integrated for (semi-)automated launch.
Ukraine became the world leader in interceptor drones in 2025–2026, with an autonomous terminal phase and scaling to thousands per month. Notably, the ceiling of these cheap interceptors is mainly a speed limit (~300 km/h) — faster jet drones escape it and force the use of scarce, expensive air-defence missiles. From here a line runs to autonomous counter-air against manned aircraft (see Chapter 9.2), though that is considerably harder against a fast, manoeuvring fighter.
For the analyst this means a new platform type to recognise and track; for aircrew it means future counter-UAS employment may take place visibly and audibly closer to the own aircraft than classic air defence. Both learning paths converge here: the threat and the defence against it evolve at the same pace.